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The Rhetoric and the Reality
of Health Care Reform Legislation
Marilyn Moon
A plethora of political autopsies have been performed on the Clinton Administration’s failed
health care reform of 1994— it was too much; it was too late; there was too much pandering;
there was too little pandering. Such critiques of this complex  undertaking are at least partially
correct. It was probably hubris to believe that such a comprehensive health care reform package
could be proposed and passed in a single year. But much of the instant analysis of its failure has
repeated the rhetoric of the debate rather than stepping back and placing the events of 1994 in
perspective. Here I focus on five areas where rhetoric confused the debate and compare them
with the underlying realities of health care reform.
Financing
Proponents of the Administration proposal argued that universal coverage could be achieved
primarily by redirecting existing revenue flows. It offered almost no new revenue sources— aside
from a “sin tax” on tobacco. The reality is that to achieve universal coverage, we all have to pay
for it, either directly or indirectly. And indirect payments can cause serious problems.
Controlling Costs
In an attempt to make cost containment efforts seem less onerous on individuals, the rhetoric
offered two somewhat contradictory strategies of imposing price controls on health care
providers and introducing market reforms, called managed competition. Presumably, managed
competition would also automatically eliminate fraud, waste, and abuse, and in some unspecified
way painlessly discipline the market for health care. The reality is that people must face difficult
choices if we are to control costs of health care. Cost containment is a much more controversial 
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issue than the Administration admitted. Many persons are nervous about the impacts of such
controls.
Choice
The Administration went out of its way to promise choice, often in ways that complicated the
plan. Opponents countered that the Administration’s plan would actually limit choice. But what
did they mean by choice? If they meant choice of doctors and hospitals, or choice of insurance
plans, the Administration’s plan stacked up very well. But the right to choose any kind of health
care at any time would have been restricted under the Clinton proposal. Moreover, choice has
long been eroding for most Americans as employers and insurance companies have imposed more
control on insurance. In this case, the rhetoric of the opponents won out over the reality of what
is already happening in our health care system.
Incremental Reform
Opponents of the Administration’s proposal claimed that successful health care reform could be
achieved by “tinkering around the edges,” keeping what was right about the health care system
and getting rid of what was wrong. The reality is that changes in one area of health care provision
affect other areas, in ways that are not always understood or anticipated, and there is little
consensus on what should be kept and what should be changed under an incremental approach.
Nostalgia
Many of those who opposed health care reform altogether expressed a longing to return to a
health care system that they remember and think still exists, but that probably hasn’t been in place
for the last decade. Their warning that we should not surrender what we have for something less
was given more credence than the Administration and other reformers realized. The reality is that
health care has already changed rapidly and will continue to change with or without health care
reform legislation. The Clinton Administration assumed that Americans understood the current
status of national health care, including its flaws, and assumed this meant they had a mandate for
change.
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The confusing rhetoric of the debate came from both proponents and opponents of health care
reform legislation. In the end, Americans seemed more comfortable with the devil they knew than
one they didn’t. It is useful to look back at the events of 1994 to sort out fact from fiction, in
anticipation that we will someday return to a serious discussion of health care reform. Let me
begin with the last area where rhetoric confused the debate.
1. Nostalgia
When proponents of the status quo describe characteristics of the health care system that they
want to retain, I wonder, “Does such an idealized system still exist, if it ever did?” Despite a
resurgence of family practitioners, few people have a personal family doctor who answers their
questions, handles every aspect of their primary care, makes referrals when necessary, and
cheerfully accepts reasonable payments from insurance companies. Few doctors deliver care with
no concern about the requirements of insurers or employers who provide that insurance. 
Furthermore, the golden years of employer-based insurance coverage— where voluntary employer
benefits were readily and generously provided— ended in the mid-1980s. Since then, the share of
people who have insurance through employers and the comprehensiveness of that insurance have
declined. Most employers now substantially restrict what they cover, usually with the help of
insurance companies that, either as direct insurers or as claims handlers, impose substantial
controls on the use of care. And many employees are required to pay substantial amounts of
money toward premiums and cost-sharing for covered services.
The reason we haven’t seen an enormous growth in the number of uninsured people in recent
years is because Medicaid— the program for low-income people in the United States— has
expanded rapidly. It covered many mothers and children, who would otherwise have been
uninsured, in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Thus there has already been a large shift to
government-provided health care. Those who deplore the growth in Medicaid must recognize that
it is filling the widening gaps in our private employer-based system.
Federal and state governments now pay for about 43% of all acute care services. Government has
a major stake in what happens to health care. To argue that government should stay out of the
system is to ignore reality; government is already heavily involved. One of my favorite quotes
from 1994 came from a lady who said she didn’t want government-controlled health care. She just 
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wanted the government to get out of the way and let Medicare do what it did for her best.
Obviously, there was some misunderstanding about the role of government in the health care
system.
Reformers often misunderstood and underestimated the fact that Americans in many cases prefer
the devil they know to the devil they don’t know. During the debate, I wrote a weekly health care
column for The Washington Post, answering questions that people sent in about reforms. I was
struck by the complex and often  convoluted ways people cobbled together their own health care.
It seemed only logical that people would welcome major change to simplify the system and make
it fairer. But if you have already worked out your cross-subsidy— perhaps you’re a private
contractor and you have a small business that doesn’t provide health insurance, but you get your
health insurance through your wife, who works for some large employer— you are satisfied. It
may not be fair for you to be subsidized by that other employer, but you’re happy with that
arrangement and you don’t want to lose it. And so to say that we were going to reform the system
by making everybody pay their fair share sounded good to people who were burdened with
subsidizing others, but not so good to people who had figured out how to adjust their
employment or other circumstances to get subsidized insurance. Even a fairer system would
create losers as well as winners.
Finally, many people don’t want to consider what would happen if the system deteriorates further.
If your ad hoc arrangements are working for you right now, it’s easier to ignore what might
happen if your circumstances change and you lose your insurance. Many people believe that
they’ve found a way to permanently game the system. We paid too little attention in this debate to
how to minimize transitory disruptions to individuals as we made changes that would improve the
overall system.
2. Financing
One of my colleagues noted that if you looked at the 1,342 pages of the Clinton proposal, all of
this talk about how many pages there were was just a ruse, because the debate never got past
page 6.
Page 6 says “Employers will pay for insurance for all of their employees.” The Clinton
Administration believed— and with good reason if you looked at the polls— that Americans 
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thought this was a good way to finance reform and hence this approach would not be very
controversial. Small business would squawk, but big business would line up behind the
Administration, and the public would accept an employer mandate as a reasonable approach.
Small business did hate mandates and, despite some opposition by big business, were able to
convince Americans that there were major reasons to be worried about such mandates. 
Mandates do create problems. An employer mandate is not the fairest way to finance health care,
and trying to make an employer mandate fairer adds a great deal of complexity to any plan, as a
reading of the portions of the Clinton bill that describe which employer's insurance pays what for
which person attests. The Clinton plan proposed adjustments to improve the fairness of the
mandate, but it meant changing the rules for lots of people. For example, there were many pages
devoted to who gets what kids, and how employers should pay on the basis of family type. While
this sounds extremely complex, it’s no more complex than the current health care system. Most
two-earner families now have two sets of health insurance, and they may or may not know how
their employers decide who covers what kid. Usually it’s by a birthday rule— sometimes it’s every
other child, sometimes it’s odd-even birthday. If you were born on the 13th you belong to one
insurer, if you were born on the 12th you belong to another insurer. The problem is those insurers
don’t agree on what the rules are. Sometimes people have to negotiate over who pays for which
children.
The difference between what happens now and what happens under an employer mandate is that
all these rules must be codified into law, to decide who pays when, how part-time employees are
treated, whether special protections are granted in various instances. These things make the
system very complicated. It is also very difficult to make a mandated system fair, because
employers will bear differential burdens as a share of the wages that they pay their workers: wages
vary substantially across employers, labor costs are more important to some employers than
others, and different employers have large numbers of part-time workers versus full-time workers.
It is no accident that companies like McDonald’s and Pizza Hut were very worried about
employer mandates. 
Among the possible financing alternatives, a mandate seemed the “least worst” option. Revenues
must come from somewhere. If you want health care reform and if you really want universal
coverage, there are four broad ways to get there, each with substantial disadvantages.
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Taxation
Taxation offers the most direct financing scheme. The single payer people were the most honest
people in this debate. They were also ignored after the second day of the debate because they said
“You have to raise taxes and you have to raise taxes substantially.” The McDermott bill, which
was the chief single payer bill under consideration, would have raised taxes by approximately 500
billion dollars per year. That’s breathtaking! But it would have saved approximately that much in
health care payments elsewhere in the economy. Employers would have paid more taxes and
smaller insurance premiums. But it still sounds like a lot of money to be funneled through the
federal government, and it scared people, particularly given the low trust in government. You can
also raise taxes less and only finance subsidies for those who cannot afford insurance. But even
then you’d have to substantially raise taxes if you’re going to bring everybody into the system.
Employer Mandates
Mandating employer payments would ensure coverage for most Americans. Mandates operate
very much like a tax. They are compulsory. But they build on existing financing so the net
increases in spending are small and do not get channeled through the tax system, and thus they
seem less bureaucratic. That’s one of the major reasons the Clinton Administration proposed their
use.
Cost Containment
Containing costs means liabilities are reduced and less financing is required. Realistically, if you
want to maintain reform for more than a few years, cost containment is necessary. Costs are
growing so fast that there is no tax revenue source or employer base that will fund health care
reform for all Americans ten years into the future without continual increases in burdens unless we
slow the rate of growth of health care spending. Cost containment thus represents an essential
financing mechanism. 
But the Clinton plan also used cost containment to limit the need for new tax revenues to cover
the unemployed uninsured. Since cost containment would eventually save the federal government
and employers a lot of money, the Clinton Administration believed it could require employers to
pay more up front initially, while using monies saved from Medicare and Medicaid through cost 
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containment to help bring the uninsured into the system. The financing mechanism in the Clinton
plan created a giant pot of funds. By throwing lots of money into the pot from many sources, it
was possible to create some subtle cross-subsidies. However, such complicated cross-subsidies
require a comprehensive plan, and thus prevented an orderly retreat to incremental reforms,
sinceto do so meant there weren't really  sufficient revenue sources to finance even a substantially
scaled-back version of reform. The Administration thus had little money to bargain with in the
summer of 1994 unless mandates and these cross-subsidies were retained.
Redefine Universal Coverage
The final financing “strategy”— used very late in the game, and not by the Administration but by
others—  was essentially to redefine universal coverage. Under such a strategy, universal coverage
was no longer 98% or 100% of all Americans, but “well, maybe 95%,” and then 91%. The view
was to declare victory at that point, and go home. Such a strategy would rely less on employers,
taxes, and cost containment because you simply don’t cover all Americans. Only small scale
subsidies for the very poor would be needed.
The way to justify this is to ask why certain groups don’t have coverage and then rule some of
them out as needing help. For example, you throw out the uninsured 25-year-olds who could
afford insurance but think that they’re going to live forever and don’t need insurance. You ignore
people with high incomes who can insure themselves. And you assume that the very poor are
going to be covered under a limited incremental subsidy, or by private charity as we have under
the present system. If the number who have coverage plus those you decide are not worthy of
attention brings you above 90%, it may be politically easier to simply declare universal coverage a
non-issue. 
But this does not ultimately solve the problem, because we still would have a large chunk of
Americans left without insurance who we presumably wanted to help. This includes many young
working families with children who cannot afford insurance unless their employers contribute.
These are people who make $25,000 a year, well above the poverty level in the United States, but
who cannot afford $6,000 a year for insurance if they have to buy it on their own. If you want to
help those people, you have to find new dollars to give them subsidies. Either require their 
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employers to do it or give them direct subsidies, which means higher taxes. You can lower their
insurance costs through cost containment. But even if you reduce health insurance costs for that
family with $25,000 a year in income from $6,000 to $5,000, they’ll still be uninsured. It would
take many years of health costs growing slower than incomes to made a dent in the problem of
affordability.
So, if we want to cover those people and make sure they get insurance, we have to raise taxes or
require employers to subsidize coverage. Cost containment or redefining the problem will not on
their own achieve universal coverage. And until we’re a little bit more honest about that, we’re
never going to get past page 6, and we’re never going to move on to some of the other equally
tough questions that have to be answered if we want health care reform.
3. Controlling Costs
Another area that’s a major stumbling block, that didn’t get much of an airing because it is so
politically sensitive, was cost containment. There was a lot of rhetoric but very little realistic
discussion. Slogans conjured up various images on both sides of this issue. Cost containment
ultimately comes down to a couple of very tough decisions. Two things are driving spending:
prices and use of health care services. If you want to slow the rate of growth of health care
spending, any economist will tell you that you must slow the growth of prices or volume of
services.
Americans feel a lot more comfortable talking about lowering prices. That sounds
straightforward: get rid of the five dollar Tylenol in the hospital and everything will be fine. But
even if we freeze the price of health care services over time, which is not very realistic, growth in
the volume of services— especially in terms of the complexity of services— will itself drive the
cost of health care up faster than incomes for most Americans. So we have to make some tough
choices and begin to ask about what services are not necessary, and whether we can find ways to
become more efficient, to find more cost saving ways to do things. All of these imply limiting the
freedom of consumers to use whatever services they wish.
The question then becomes, who do we trust to manage cost containment for us into the future?
If you believe the market will do it, you essentially are saying you believe that competing entities,
be they HMOs or insurance companies or any of the other new health care organizations that are 
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arising out there, are going to find ways to be more efficient. That does not mean that there will be no tough
choices. Rather, you are saying you trust the competition of the marketplace and insurance companies to
make these tough decisions. Or you must rely on the government, through regulatory actions, to make these
decisions. If you’re really serious about cost containment, some group is going to have to impose
restrictions on American consumers. At the beginning of the debate, many Americans were enthusiastic
about reining in their insurance companies. But they did not warm to the idea of replacing those insurers
with government control.
Further, it is not enough to simply say “the market will do it” and suddenly, somehow, prices and costs go
down. There has to be some kind of intervention in the system. We haven’t yet had a very serious debate
about this, and the rhetoric implied that once we chose who to put in charge, the world would automatically
change.
If we really want to slow the overall growth rate of health care spending, some basic things must happen.
And some current “remedies” will not work. For example, when groups have been able to treat themselves
as separate from everybody else— for example, Medicare or large employers— they have been able to seek
special discounts and therefore hold down their own costs. This has helped some of these large employers
or managed care plans appear very successful at cost containment. But the rest of the system may be
bearing the costs of those discounts if they have not led to more efficient delivery of care. If so, we’re not
solving the problem for society, we’re only solving it for certain groups. Once the market gets savvier, once
more and more people find ways to band together and get similar kinds of market power, everybody’s going
to want discounts and that nice avenue is not going to be available. Then we’ll have to face some of the
tougher choices of how to truly manage care. 
4. Choice
Choice was another scare issue well manipulated by opponents of the Clinton proposal. While
health care alliances represented a clever element in the Clinton health care plan, they also played
well into fears about choice. 
Ironically, health care alliances will probably flourish voluntarily specifically because they help
with choice. That is, small businesses may be able to band together and get enough power to
compete effectively with large businesses for discounts and other preferential treatment that will
level the playing field a bit. Alliances also can be very useful if we move to a managed care
environment. I’m not afraid of managed care, of being in an HMO, if I can choose which HMO. If 
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workers can choose among competing health care plans, that will put further pressure for quality
on the system. And this is exactly what alliances are intended to do.
Choice of physician is another goal of many Americans. Again, the Clinton proposal actually went
out of its way to require that plans have “point of service” options so people could go to non-
network doctors. There was also a requirement to keep so-called indemnity plans that allow
individuals to have fee-for-service insurance if they wished. Thus, many of the criticisms leveled at
the Clinton plan regarding choice were unfair.
On the other hand, choice was used in other ways by some who objected to the plan. For
example, if you meant by choice making sure that all insurance companies regardless of quality
stayed in business, then the Clinton approach was bad. This was essentially the theme of the
insurance industry during the debate— and presumably the motivation behind the Harry and
Louise ads.
Or if you meant that you wanted to choose whether or not to have insurance, then the Clinton
plan and all other serious health proposals limited this choice. This is because if we really want to
pool risks and do what I think insurance means, which is sharing risk, then everyone needs to be
in the system. This type of choice thus undermines other goals.
Remember, too, that choice adds complexity. Offering choice was a second major factor making
the Administration’s proposal very complex. There were many requirements to permit people to
choose among plans, including assuring that insurance companies would compete fairly. The best
way for an insurance company to do well in today’s market is to insure only healthy people. If you
can make sure that all you insure are healthy people, you can keep premiums low and appear to be
successful at containing costs. If we want a world in which we have good choice but we also
share risk, a number of additional protections are needed— all of which make the system more
complex.
Mechanisms for selecting risks can be very subtle or very crude. If you put the HMO signup office
for Medicare beneficiaries on the third floor when there’s no elevator in the building, that’s one
way to get a healthy pick of folks. In contrast, I was struck by how cleverly a Washington-based
health care plan was advertising to attract good risks. This plan offered discounts in health clubs,
and if you had a great interest in making sure that your holiday spa membership was subsidized, 
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the plan would do that. It’s a good idea; they’re encouraging you to get exercise. But that’s going to be a
lot more appealing to young folks who like spandex than to some of the rest of us. The plan also offered
child care information and some child care subsidies. That meant it would probably attract people who are
healthy enough to have two parents working and a child that they can put in child care, which means the
insurer is going to get a healthy selection of families. The more choice and flexibility allowed in terms of
services offered, the greater the opportunities for selecting on risk.
So one of the big questions is what does choice mean? What are we willing to accept or not accept? And
what additional complications are added by choice? Cooler heads did not prevail in this part of the debate.
5. Incremental Reform
Finally, I would argue that incremental reform is not nearly as simple as people have suggested,
making it in reality a less viable option. Consider a couple of examples.
Selection
One of the people who wrote to my column about incremental reform asked “Why can’t
we just keep everything that’s good and not get rid of anything that we like, and only get
rid of stuff we don’t like? For example, I like the fact that my insurance company charges
me less because I’m healthy and as a consequence I pay less for health care than all these
other people who have unhealthy lifestyles.” This is the person who must have just joined
the Washington health plan I mentioned earlier, got his health club subsidy, and is
happily exercising in the weight room. By not sharing risks, the costs of insurance to a
family with a sick child will be higher. The problem is that incremental reform is very
difficult to do in a world in which you allow a lot of activities that are good for
individuals but not good for society. Selection is one of them. But there are others.
Pre-existing Conditions
Most everyone would agree we should get rid of pre-existing conditions. Senator Robert Dole
said that he was going to make sure that everybody was happy with his incremental plan because 
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he would eliminate pre-existing conditions. His plan did, but only if you already had insurance. If
you changed jobs and you had insurance at your old job, you could not be denied immediate
coverage for any pre-existing condition. If, however, you did not have a job, or you did not have
insurance, you had to wait as long as a year under his bill before pre-existing limitations would be
lifted for you.
There’s a simple reason for that. If you have a voluntary system where not everybody is insured,
you must allow insurers to penalize people who want to sign up at the last minute. You don’t
want that 25-year-old “immortal” guy who’s out there pumping iron to come in when he needs
knee surgery, sign up the day before, get his knee surgery, and then withdraw from the plan. You
want him to have to buy insurance and stay in the plan. Thus, it would be unrealistic for Senator
Dole to truly eliminate pre-existing conditions in an incremental plan.
Portability
Similarly, we heard promises that portability would be allowed in incremental approaches.
Someone came up to me after a speech and asked, “What could be the problem if health insurance
is portable? I work for IBM right now, and I really love their health care plan. But if I’m thinking
of going out and working for a small firm, I’ll just take that health care plan with me when I go.
And everything will be fine.”
Portability doesn’t work that way in a world in which you don’t have universal coverage. What
portability means is that if you change jobs and if your new employer offers insurance and if your
old employer offered insurance, you can sign up for whatever your new employer offers. You
don’t get to take the good stuff with you, once you find it. You get what’s available at the next
job— if anything.
In practice, it is very difficult to wring out some of the things that are bad about the health care
system and that people don’t like without disadvantaging someone else. There is no free lunch
here. If we want to eliminate high cost insurance for people who are sick, healthy people must pay
higher costs. There’s no magic to it, but that doesn’t make it any easier to do. 
14
The Future
Lourie Memorial Lecture Policy Brief
So let me look very briefly into my crystal ball. In 1995 or 1996 we are likely to see an attempt to re-
energize health care reform. The Clinton Administration has tied so much of its existence to health care
reform that it will be very difficult for them to say “We lost, we’re going home, we’re not going to do
anything about this for two years unless you re-elect us.” And it will be difficult for some of the more
moderate opponents of comprehensive reform to say “We really didn’t mean it anyway, we don’t want to
do anything, we’re happy with the way things turned out.” But although we will talk about it, we’re likely
to see little real action. Even incremental reforms will be controversial since it will be difficult to find
agreement among various bills that don’t agree on how long pre-existing condition limits should last, how
much restriction there should be on the selectivity bias that’s out there, or what kinds of controls to put on
the system. So we’re likely to get pretty bogged down.
The Clinton Administration might consider doing “something for kids.” It sounds good; it’s awfully hard to
be against covering children. Plus children are very cheap to insure since not many of them get sick,
although when they do it’s a big problem. But even this will be difficult, however, because just to
provide additional coverage for children would still require new revenues, and those won't be easy
to identify.
States are poised, however, to do some interesting things with the Medicaid program. We have
seen a number of applications of states for Medicaid waivers to experiment with new ways to
expand coverage. We’re going to see more of those in the future.
And there is going to be considerable change at the federal level even if there is no serious attempt
at health care reform. Medicare is likely to be up for more cuts, in some cases serious cuts. We’re
also likely to talk about what to do about Medicaid, which is an extremely expensive program, has
been growing rapidly and will continue to do so. The whole question of federal largesse is
extremely important. Forty-three percent is a lot of the health care bill to fund, and it means that if
the federal government decides to tighten up on Medicare and Medicaid, we’re going to be
squeezing down on the health care sector, which will have impacts on all the rest of us who are
not necessarily directly involved.
As I’ve already mentioned, the golden age of employer-based coverage is over, so coverage is
likely to continue to be more of a problem, particularly if growth in health care spending picks up
again. That growth has slowed somewhat, and prices have moderated, but we don’t know how
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much of this is legitimate change that will last for a long time and how much is either the
traditional reaction of the private sector when they’re afraid that government controls are coming 
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or one-time adjustments to changes in the health care market. At the end of the Carter
Administration there was a very good example of reaction to fear of government control on
hospitals. Hospital controls were being threatened. Hospital spending went down from double
digits to single digits. But the year after hospital cost containment legislation failed to pass they
were back up to around 20% a year for a while. And restructuring in the private market place,
where, for example, employers are driving tougher bargains concerning health care spending, may
be one-time adjustments as employees are shifted into more stringent managed care plans. So we
are likely to see another jump n the not too distant future in some of these prices.
My most certain prediction is that this will be a period of full employment for health economists,
as we go through a time of great flux and change. Although opponents of health care reform
should not celebrate too much, we are unlikely to see a serious debate of major reform in the next
couple of years. Instead, we are likely to just muddle through for the next decade or more. 
